Saturday, July 29, 2023

The Austrian School on the Causes and Recovery of the Great Depression

 

As we approach the centenary of the onset of the Great Depression, a pivotal moment in global economic history that started with the infamous stock market crash in October 1929 and stretched until the late 1930s, the debate surrounding its causes remains rich and complex. The discourse of economists and historians who, though concurring on foundational facts like the market crash and subsequent bank failures, engage in the ongoing debate concerning the specific catalysts and relative importance of different economic factors that led to the Depression. The Monetarist and Keynesian theories dominate the literature, but there is a lesser-known theory (at least amongst the general population) that offers a distinctive interpretation of the causes of the Great Depression.

The Austrian School of Economics originated in the late 19th century and its adherents argue that the only way to really understand the economy is by examining the actions of individuals. They strongly oppose governmental efforts to interfere with the market, believing that doing so leads to problems. The two most prominent Austrian theorists of the twentieth century were Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, more commonly known as F.A. Hayek. To best understand this economic theory, we need to understand their views on the potential to control the economy. Hayek, in a speech he made when he accepted the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences in 1974 stressed that it was foolish for social scientists, economists among them, to think they could control society in the same way a physical scientist could control his subject.[1]

 The Austrian School posits that the Great Depression was not a random event or a result of unregulated market forces. Rather, it was the predictable outcome of rampant overinvestment fueled by the Federal Reserve Bank’s artificially low-interest rates throughout the 1920s. Central to accepting this concern is the Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) which argues that when central banks lower interest rates, business firms are tempted to borrow and invest in ways that they would not under different criteria. This, according to the Austrian School, leads to malinvestment. Hayek wrote, "the past instability of the market economy is the consequence of the exclusion of the most important regulator of the market mechanism, money, from being regulated by the market process."[2] In other words, interference with the money supply leads to instabilities because individuals who make up the market are having to make economic decisions in an environment that does not flow naturally.

 The primary cause of the Great Depression according to Hayek was the fact that central banks, to fix falling prices, which Hayek argued were beneficial and in the case of the United States were due to technological advancements making manufacturing cheaper, extended the boom by keeping access to money easy and thus fueling malinvestment. He argued that if the central banks had not interfered in 1927 then the boom would have ended two years early and not led to the disaster that it did.[3]

 On the matter of economic revitalization from the Great Depression, it is inevitable that the Austrian School diverges from many mainstream economic theories, positing that the economic recovery was largely enabled by market mechanisms rather than government interventions. Despite the far-reaching implementation of New Deal policies, Hayek and his Austrian contemporaries viewed these as obstacles to the market's natural recovery process. Hayek cautioned, "the curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.”[4]

 Hayek's warning encapsulates the Austrian viewpoint that these interventions potentially interfered with the natural corrective processes of the market, and instead of fostering recovery, might have exacerbated the situation and prolonged the depression. They argue that these measures, while they might have provided temporary relief, did not contribute to a lasting, sustainable recovery.

 Hayek and the Austrian School have never influenced policymakers to the extent Keynesian theory has and due to the ratchet effect and the fact that through crises in the twentieth century that paved the way for bigger and bigger government, we have become accustomed and even sought to have greater economic control by the government means we are not able to study the merits or lack thereof of the Austrian theory. Hayek even contributed insight into the reason for the ratchet effect by arguing that the crises that brings about increased government interference develops a bureaucracy that becomes entrenched and that even when the crisis subsides the populace remains convinced of the need for the bureaucracy because they believe it possesses technical expertise that unless maintained may throw the system back into chaos.[5] The unfortunate consequences of the ratchet effect should inspire us to consider the Austrian School as a more viable option for responding to economic downturns.

 In conclusion, through the lens of the Austrian School and fortified by Hayek's insights, the Great Depression can be seen as both precipitated and prolonged by monetary policy manipulation and government intervention. This perspective underscores the importance of allowing markets to self-regulate and adjust naturally, offering invaluable insights into one of the most significant economic downturns in history.


[1] Friedrich August von Hayek – Prize Lecture. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2023. Sun. 30 Jul 2023. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1974/hayek/lecture/         

[2] Friedrich August von Hayek, The Denationalisation of Money, the Argument Refined: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), 102. 

[3] Antonio Magliulo, "Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did He Really Change His Mind?" The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 23, no. 1 (2016/01/02 2016), https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2013.792373: 38-39.

[4] Friedrich A. von Hayek, and William Warren Bartley, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, University of Chicago Press ed., vol. 1, vol. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 76. 

[5] Robert Higgs, "Crisis, Bigger Government, and Ideological Change: Two Hypotheses on the Ratchet Phenomenon," Explorations in Economic History 22, no. 1 (2013-02-24 1985): 13.

 

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